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Is It Time to Revoke the Tax-Exempt Status 








Rural electric cooperatives (RECs) were created with government 
assistance in the mid-1930s as part of a campaign to bring electricity to 
rural areas in an effort to improve economic output and quality of living. 
By the early 1950s, the entirety of America had access to electricity, 
fulfilling the federal government’s mission. Today, these cooperatives 
strongly resemble their for-profit counterparts, but remain tax-exempt 
under § 501(c)(12) of the Internal Revenue Code. This note will argue that, 
in light of the changes that RECs have undergone and the environment in 
which they now operate, their tax-exempt status is no longer warranted and 
in fact works against REC member interests. This note will then explore the 
impact of taxing RECs as regular cooperatives, which are subject to 
taxation under Subchapter T of the Internal Revenue Code. 
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I. Introduction 
Rural electrical cooperatives1 (“RECs” or “electrical cooperatives”) 
are an integral part of the electrical infrastructure in the United States, 
providing power to a significant portion of the American people.2 Despite 
their size and reach, RECs differ from investor-owned or municipal electric 
utilities in three distinct ways. First, they function under a cooperative 
business model, in which the consumers own the utility rather than 
investors or municipalities. 3  Second, RECs were created specifically to 
serve rural areas where investor- or municipally-owned electric companies 
did not offer electrical service.4  Third, Congress specifically designated 
RECs as tax-exempt nonprofits 5  and created a program of federally 
subsidized loans to speed the electrification of rural America.6 These three 
factors combined to make RECs incredibly effective in spreading access to 
electricity across the United States: just a few decades after their creation, 
every corner of the country had gained access to electrical service.7 
Part II will discuss the history of the rural electric cooperative 
movement and the reasons why early cooperatives were seen as meriting 
tax exemption. Part III will explore the types of RECs as well as the 
organizational and operational requirements necessary to maintain their tax 
exemption. Part IV considers changes that the electrical cooperative sector 
                                                                                                                           
 1. This note uses “cooperative” rather than the hyphenated “co-operative” and 
“nonprofit” rather than “non-profit” or “not-for-profit.” This decision is in keeping with the 
Internal Revenue Service’s hyphenation practices. 
 2. See Co-op Facts and Figures, NAT’L RURAL ELEC. COOP. ASS’N, 
http://www.nreca.coop/about-electric-cooperatives/co-op-facts-figures (last visited Sept. 28, 
2013) [Hereinafter Co-op Facts and Figures] (explaining that RECs serve an estimated 
forty-two million people in forty-seven states) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE 
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 3. See id. (noting that RECs are private, independent, nonprofit electric utilities 
owned by the customers they serve). 
 4. See infra notes 9–12 and accompanying text. 
 5. Although often used interchangeably, nonprofit and tax-exempt are distinct 
concepts. Nonprofit describes an organizational structure created by state law, whereas tax-
exempt is a status bestowed by the Internal Revenue Service on organizations that meet 
certain requirements. For a discussion of tax exemption requirements, see I.R.S. Publ’n 557 
Tax-Exempt Status for Your Org. 57–59 (Rev. Oct. 2011). 
 6. See J. GARWOOD & W. TUTHILL, THE RURAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION: 
AN EVALUATION 60 (1963) (describing the subsidy features of the rural electrification 
program). 
 7. See D. CLAYTON BROWN, ELECTRICITY FOR RURAL AMERICA 113 (1980) 
(discussing the success of the rural electrification movement). 
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has undergone in recent years and the problems that have arisen as RECs 
have begun to resemble for-profit entities. Lastly, Part V questions the 
continued value of sustaining the tax and regulatory exemptions of these 
cooperatives, and explores ways to encourage behavior that is in keeping 
with cooperative principles.8 
 
II. History of the Electric Cooperative Movement 
A. The Early Years 
Cooperatives were not the first model of electrical distribution in 
America. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, almost all 
electricity was generated and distributed by investor-owned power 
companies. 9  In these early years, electricity was primarily available to 
urban areas, where higher population densities made distribution profitable 
because the close proximity of customers to one another meant that fewer 
power lines needed to be strung.10 These power companies refused to serve 
rural areas because the overhead cost of wiring and providing service to 
these areas was deemed to be too much for the company to absorb, and if 
passed on to the rural customers through price increases, electricity would 
be prohibitively expensive.11 Moreover, because rural customers lacked the 
funds to purchase machinery that would use large amounts of electricity, 
private power companies would not receive sufficient returns on their 
investments.12 
With private power companies uninterested, farmers and rural 
communities began forming cooperatives in the early years of the twentieth 
century to distribute electricity themselves.13 Modeled on those in Canada 
and Europe, farmers saw the first RECs as little different from the 
                                                                                                                           
 8. This note will not examine the federal loan program for RECs, a subject that has 
been thoroughly examined elsewhere. See, e.g., Richard P. Keck, Reevaluating the Rural 
Electrification Administration: A New Deal for the Taxpayer, 16 ENVTL. L. 39, 87–89 (1985) 
(criticizing subsidized government lending to electrical cooperatives as a costly government 
venture with no remaining public policy purpose). 
 9. See BROWN, supra note 7, at 11ԟ12 (commenting on the state of early electrical 
distribution in the United States). 
 10. See id. (explaining the financial reasons why urban populations were first to 
receive electrical service). 
 11. See id. (stating the reasons for the slow rate at which rural areas were being wired 
by investor-owned power companies). 
 12. See id. (noting the problems with electrifying rural areas). 
 13. See id. at 13 (discussing the early attempts by farmers to organize electrical 
cooperatives). 
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agricultural cooperatives that had long served them.14 Such early attempts at 
self-help were few, limited in scope, and saw mixed success because 
organizers faced hostility from the private power companies from which 
they purchased their electricity. 15  Further, these organizers lacked the 
technical and managerial expertise to operate the cooperatives. 16  As a 
result, the 1920 census found that fewer than five hundred thousand of six 
million farms reported having electric lights.17 Those numbers dwindled in 
the rural west and south, where electrification ranged between ten and less 
than one percent.18 
 
B. The New Deal and the REA 
The Depression-era enactment of the Rural Electrification Act19 
and creation of the Rural Electrification Administration by executive 
order 20  dramatically changed the landscape of power distribution in 
America. 21  Although bringing electricity to rural areas had been a 
progressive cause for the preceding decade, the movement gained vital 
support from the federal government during the Great Depression as a part 
of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal.22 In response to increasingly vocal 
demands for federal action to improve economic output in rural areas, 
President Roosevelt created the Rural Electrification Administration (“the 
REA”) in May of 1935 to spend the 100 million dollars that Congress had 
allocated for rural electricity distribution. 23  Despite early government 
reluctance, providing cooperatives with administrative guidance and low 
                                                                                                                           
 14. See id. at 16–18 (stating that American farmers looked to the success of electrical 
cooperatives in Canada and Europe, where ninety percent of farms had electricity). 
 15. See id. at 15 (noting the mortality rate of early cooperatives and the causes of their 
failure). 
 16. See id. (explaining that a lack of necessary expertise damaged early RECs). 
 17. See id. at xv (“[T]he federal census of 1920 . . . reported that of the total 6,000,000 
farms in the United States, only 452,620 had electric lights and 643,899 had some form of 
running water.”). 
 18. See id. at xvi (“The Midwest and South ranked lowest, ranging from 10 percent to 
less than 1 percent.”). 
 19. Ch. 432, 49 Stat. 1363 (1936). 
 20. Exec. Order No. 7037 (May 11, 1935). 
 21. See generally BROWN, supra note 7 (discussing the changes that took place in the 
American electrical utility industry after the enactment of the REA). 
 22. See id. at 35–46 (explaining that tireless advocates of rural electrification—chiefly 
Morris L. Cooke, who would be appointed the first Director of the REA—and an 
experimental electric cooperative within the Tennessee Valley Authority highlighted the 
need and economic feasibility of bringing power to rural communities, greatly bolstering the 
cause in Washington). 
 23. See id. (chronicling the formation of the REA). 
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interest loans was soon recognized as the quickest and most efficient means 
of fulfilling the agency’s objectives.24 
The choice to foster the formation and growth of electrical 
cooperatives as a means of national electrification was an overwhelming 
success. 25  In just a few years, the REA had been transformed from a 
temporary relief organization into a permanent government agency within 
the Department of Agriculture, making subsidized loans to the hundreds of 
newly formed RECs that were requesting funds to string electrical wires 
through their communities.26 
The process of rural electrification was rapid: In 1939, 
approximately twenty-five percent of all farms had electrical service.27 Less 
than two decades later, the REA had loaned over 2.7 billion dollars to over 
one thousand cooperatives and other entities, facilitating the electrification 
of the entire country. 28  The original RECs were almost exclusively 
distribution cooperatives that delivered power to consumers.29 Only after 
distribution networks were firmly established did RECs begin to generate 
and transmit their own electricity. 30  Most rural electrical cooperatives 
formed at the REA’s encouragement are still in operation today.31 They are 
represented in Washington by the National Rural Electrical Cooperative 
Association (“NRECA”), whose 905 members own 42% of the nation’s 
electrical distribution lines, and serve an estimated 42 million people in 47 
                                                                                                                           
 24. See id. at 48–57 (recounting how that agency had originally planned to work with 
private power companies, but ultimately settled on promoting and assisting cooperatives 
because the private companies failed to present plans that would have made electricity 
affordable). 
 25. See id. at 74–75 (outlining improvements made by electrification). 
 26. See id. at 58–66 (chronicling changes at the REA as it became a permanent 
government agency within the Department of Agriculture). 
 27. See id. at 75 (“By 1939 the improvements wrought by electricity were visible in 
rural life. REA had 417 cooperatives serving 268,000 households and had loaned $3,644,711 
for wiring and plumbing. About 25 percent of all farms had service.”). 
 28. See id. at 113 (“The agency had, since 1935, loaned a total of $2,788,136,191 to 
983 cooperatives, 44 public power districts, 26 other public bodies and 25 electric 
companies.”). 
 29. See Joel A. Youngblood, Alive and Well; the Rural Electrification Act Preempts 
State Condemnation Law: City of Morgan City v. South Louisiana Electric Cooperative 
Ass’n, 16 ENERGY L.J. 489, 491–92 (1995) (noting that RECs, as a result of the REA, “began 
to urge rural residents to form cooperatives—private, non-profit membership corporations 
organized under state law—for the purpose of supplying members with central station 
power”). 
 30. See id. at 492 (explaining that the construction of transmission and generation 
facilities (G&Ts), which generate and transmit their own electricity, increased markedly as 
the “integrity of the rural power distribution improved”). 
 31. See id. at 493 (“Today, most RECs have come full circle and engage not only in 
the distribution of power, but also in its generation and transmission.”). 
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states.32 In addition, cooperative electrical generation companies produce 
nearly 5% of the nation’s power.33 Despite their rural moniker, RECs now 
serve a significant number of urban and suburban areas as well. 34 
Throughout this growth and modernization, cooperatives have retained their 
distinctive business model—and their federal tax-exempt status.35 
 
III. Organization and Tax Characteristics of Cooperatives 
A. Types of RECs 
RECs fall into two basic categories: distribution cooperatives, and 
generation and transmission cooperatives (G&Ts). 36  Distribution 
cooperatives, sometimes called “DISCOs,” carry electricity from 
transmission substations to consumers. 37  Because of the expense and 
technical demands of electrical generation and transmission, the RECs 
formed during the early years of the REA were almost exclusively created 
to distribute electricity to rural farms. 38  These cooperatives purchased 
power from investor-owned utilities or Federal Power projects and 
distributed it to their members.39 Today, many purchase power from other 
                                                                                                                           
 32. See Co-op Facts and Figures, supra note 2 (describing the current state of the 
nation’s consumer-owned electric utility network). 
 33. See id. (noting the electrical production of RECs).  
 34. See Jim Cooper, Electric Co-ops: From New Deal to Bad Deal?, 45 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 335, 336 (2008) (“Most co-ops operate in a few rural counties where customers live 
far apart, although an increasing number of co-ops serve populous suburbs.”). 
 35. See Keck, supra note 8, at 71 (explaining that the tax exempt status of the 
cooperatives reduces REC power costs). 
 36. See Youngblood, supra note 29, at 491–93 (describing the benefits of distribution 
cooperatives and generation and transmission facilities (G&Ts), which have developed as a 
result of the REA). 
 37. See Electricity 101, NAT’L RURAL ELEC. COOP. ASS’N, 
http://www.nreca.coop/about-electric-cooperatives/electricity-101 (last visited Sept. 28, 
2013) (“Distribution is the process of carrying electricity from transmission substations to 
homes and businesses.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 38. See GARWOOD & TUTHILL, supra note 6, at 14 (“During the first few years of the 
program, over 80 percent of the customers of REA-borrowers were farmers.”). 
 39. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL, GENERAL ACCT. OFFICE, CED-81-14, FINANCING 
RURAL ELECTRIC GENERATING FACILITIES: A LARGE AND GROWING ACTIVITY 7 (1980) 
[hereinafter FINANCING RURAL ELECTRIC GENERATING FACILITIES] (“For the most part, the 
cooperatives purchased electric power from Federal power projects or electric companies 
and distributed it to consumers.”). 
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cooperatives.40 The majority of RECs operating today adhere to this model: 
840 of the 905 members of NRECA are solely distribution cooperatives.41 
As their name implies, G&T cooperatives serve to generate power 
and transmit it to members. 42  The members of these RECs are not 
consumers of electricity, but are distributors who sell the electricity to the 
consumers. 43  As REC-owned distribution networks became established 
after the Great Depression, RECs began to form cooperatives among 
themselves to assist in the purchasing and distribution of power.44 At first, 
these cooperatives served primarily as service organizations to assist their 
members in arranging and contracting for the bulk purchase of power.45 
Eventually, many of them began to build their own generation capability to 
reduce their dependence on outside sources of electric power.46 This process 
was facilitated in large part by the REA’s subsidized loans, which allowed 
RECs to finance these projects far more easily than investor-owned 
utilities.47 For the first five years of the REA loan program, only about three 
percent of the REA’s loans were for generation and transmission projects.48 
By the latter half of the 1950s, that number had jumped to thirty-one 
percent. 49  The soaring interest rates of the late 1970s and early 1980s 
allowed RECs to use their highly preferential government loans to finance 
generation facilities far more affordably than could private companies.50 
                                                                                                                           
 40. See Electricity 101, supra note 37 (noting that companies which provide both 
general and transmission functions are now “owned by the distribution cooperatives to 
whom they supply wholesale power”). 
 41. See Co-op Facts and Figures, supra note 2 (specifying that out of the 905 NRECA 
cooperative members, 840 are distribution cooperatives and 65 are G&T cooperatives). 
 42. See Electricity 101, supra note 37 (explaining that G&Ts provide both generation 
and transmission functions). 
 43. See id. (“Many electric utilities are exclusively distribution utilities—that is, they 
purchase wholesale power from others to distribute it, over their own distribution lines, to 
the consumer.”). 
 44. See Keck, supra note 8, at 47 (describing the shift from purely distribution to 
G&T). 
 45. See FINANCING RURAL ELECTRIC GENERATING FACILITIES, supra note 39, at 7 
(“Initially, these power cooperatives served largely as a service organization for the 
members, . . . contracting for the purchase of bulk power, which in turn was sold to 
distribution members.”). 
 46. See id. (“[S]ome of these power cooperatives began to build their own generating 
capability to reduce their dependence on outside sources of electric power.”). 
 47. See id. (noting the subsidized loans provided by the REA). 
 48. See GARWOOD & TUTHILL, supra note 6, at 15 (noting the amounts loaned to G&T 
cooperatives). 
 49. See FINANCING RURAL ELECTRIC GENERATING FACILITIES, supra note 39, at 7 
(noting the increase in funds loaned to G&Ts). 
 50. See John Simpson, Co-ops Battle Clinton Plan to Cut REA Loan Program, 131 
PUB. UTIL. FORT. 41, 41 (1993) (explaining that REA loans have come under frequent 
attacks in the last few decades because of the advantages they bestow on RECs. Presidents 
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During this period, G&T cooperatives began to form joint ventures with 
private power companies eager to gain access to RECs’ dramatically lower 
borrowing rates.51 G&Ts nonetheless remain few in number, accounting for 
only a fraction of NRECA’s membership.52 
 
B. Tax Characteristics of Cooperatives 
Rural electric cooperatives have been exempt from federal taxation 
since the Revenue Act of 1916,53 well before the New Deal.54 Today, all are 
organized as nonprofit entities and granted tax-exempt status under 
§ 501(c)(12) of the Internal Revenue Code (“the Code”).55 This section of 
the modern Code permits tax exemption for “benevolent life insurance 
associations of a purely local character, mutual ditch or irrigation 
companies, mutual or cooperative telephone companies, or like 
organizations.” 56  Electrical cooperatives have been viewed as “like 
organizations” appropriate for tax exemption virtually since their 
inception. 57  In 1980, Congress formalized this status by amending 
§ 501(c)(12) to include § 501(c)(12)(C), which explicitly includes RECs in 
                                                                                                                 
Reagan, H. W. Bush, and Clinton each sought to reduce the subsidy of loans to RECs, only 
to be thwarted by Congress). 
 51. See Joe D. Pace & John H. Landon, Introducing Competition into the Electric 
Utility Industry: An Economic Appraisal, 3 ENERGY L.J. 1, 7 (1982) (“G&Ts and some 
distribution cooperatives have also received REA loan guarantees in order to finance 
purchase of ownership shares in investor-owned utilities’ large coal and nuclear generating 
plants.”). 
 52. See Electricity 101, supra note 37 (noting that only 65 of NRECA’s 905 members 
are G&T cooperatives). 
 53. Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. 64-271, 39 Stat. 756, 767 (codified as amended at 
26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(12) (2012)). 
 54. See Robert P. Carlisle, Note, Cotter & Co. v. United States: The Federal Circuit 
Finds the Meaning of Subchapter T to Be Less Than Cooperative, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 565, 572 
(1986) (“Although the 1913 Act did not specifically mention cooperative associations, it did, 
nevertheless, exempt from taxation ‘agricultural and horticultural organizations.’”). 
 55. See Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(12) (2012) (exempting 
“cooperative telephone companies, or like organizations; but only if 85 percent or more of 
the income consists of amounts collected from members for the sole purpose of meeting 
losses and expenses”). 
 56. Id. at § 501(c)(12)(C); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(12)–1 (as amended in 1979) 
(“The phrase of a purely local character applies to benevolent life insurance associations, 
and not to the other organizations specified in § 501(c)(12).”). 
 57. See Michael Seto & Cheryl Chasin, General Survey of I.R.C. 501(c)(12) 
Cooperatives and Examination of Current Issues, EXEMPT ORG. 2002 CONTINUING PROF’L 
EDUC. TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM 176 (2002) (explaining that I.T. 1671, C.B. II-1, 
158 (1923) and Rev. Rul. 67-265, 1967-2 C.B. 205 recognized tax-exempt status of rural 
electric cooperatives). 
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its scope.58 To qualify for tax exemption under 501(c)(12), the Internal 
Revenue Service (“the Service” or “the I.R.S.”) requires organizations to: 
(1) be organized and operated under cooperative principles; (2) adhere to 
the activities for which it was created; and (3) derive no less than eighty-
five percent of its income from members.59 
 
1. Organization and Operation as a Cooperative 
All organizations exempt from federal taxation under § 501(c)(12) 
must adhere to a cooperative structure.60 At its most basic, a cooperative is 
an organization owned and operated by customers who join together for 
their mutual benefit.61 The purpose of the organization must be to help the 
members serve themselves, rather than to generate a profit.62 Outside of 
these generalities, the diversity of cooperatives makes more specific 
characteristics difficult to pin down.63 Justice Brandeis once noted this fact 
when he wrote that “[n]o one plan of organization is to be labeled as truly 
co-operative to the exclusion of others.”64  
Nonetheless, the seminal discussion of the cooperative model 
comes from Puget Sound Plywood, Inc. v. Commissioner,65 where Judge 
Pierce identified the three fundamental principles that have persisted since 
the earliest formal cooperatives: 
(1) Subordination of capital, both as regards control over 
the cooperative undertaking, and as regards the ownership 
of the pecuniary benefits arising therefrom; (2) democratic 
control by the worker-members themselves; and (3) the 
vesting in and the allocation among the worker-members of 
all fruits and increases arising from their cooperative 
                                                                                                                           
 58. See Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-605, 94 Stat. 3521 
(codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) (listing “mutual or cooperative electric 
company” in § 501(c)(12)(C)). 
 59. See Seto & Chasin, supra note 57, at 177 (identifying the three requirements for 
tax exemption under § 501(c)(12)). 
 60. See id. at 178 (“[The three] basic requirements apply to cooperatives described in 
section 501(c)(12) as well as those described in Subchapter T and I.R.C. 521. They must be 
satisfied to qualify for and maintain exemption under I.R.C. 501(c)(12).”). 
 61. See Carlisle, supra note 54, at 567 (defining “cooperative” as an enterprise owned 
and operated primarily for the benefit of those using its services). 
 62. See id. (explaining that cooperatives have not been organized “for the production 
of profit attributable to the enterprise itself,” but to help members serve themselves). 
 63. See id. (noting that the application of specific characteristics to cooperative 
associations is difficult). 
 64. Frost v. Corp. Comm’n, 278 U.S. 515, 546 (1929). 
 65. Puget Sound Plywood, Inc. v. Comm’r, 44 T.C. 305 (1965), acq., 1966-2 C.B. 3. 
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endeavor (i.e., the excess of the operating revenues over the 
costs incurred in generating those revenues), in proportion 
to the worker-members’ active participation in the 
cooperative endeavor.66 
The first principle, the subordination of capital, orients the cooperative to 
serve the member-patrons (“members”) rather than those who supplied 
capital.67 The result is that members, the very individuals or entities that 
patronize the organization, are the primary beneficiaries of cooperative 
activities.68 This orientation is distinct from that of a corporation, where 
investors have the ability to control the business and receive pecuniary gain 
based upon their investment.69 
The second principle, democratic control, requires that members 
have a voice in the cooperative’s operation.70 Each member has one, and 
only one, vote in electing the organization’s officers and other important 
decisions.71 This is notably different from a corporation, where votes are 
allocated by share, allowing those with larger ownership stakes to have a 
greater voice in business decision-making.72 
The third principle of cooperatives is the proportional vesting and 
allocating of profits to members. A cooperative’s net income immediately 
vests to members as “member equity,” based on the amount that each 
member used the organization’s services.73 In other words, the cooperative 
returns to its members the funds that it would otherwise retain as profits 
                                                                                                                           
 66. Id. at 308. 
 67. See Seto & Chasin, supra note 57, at 178 (explaining that subordination of capital 
“requires the contributors of capital to the cooperative, in their status as equity owners, 
neither control the operations nor receive most of the pecuniary benefits of the cooperative’s 
operations,” making cooperatives more member-oriented). 
 68. See Puget Sound Plywood, Inc., 44 T.C. at 309 (“[T]he fruits and increases which 
the worker-members produce through their joint efforts are vested in and retained by the 
workers themselves, rather than in and by the association, as such, which functions only as 
an instrumentality for the benefit of the workers . . . .”). 
 69. See id. (distinguishing between the pecuniary gain distribution scheme of a 
cooperative and that of a corporation). 
 70. See Seto & Chasin, supra note 57, at 178 (“A cooperative satisfies [the democratic 
control requirement] by ‘periodically holding democratically conducted meetings, with 
members, each one with one vote, electing officers to operate the organization’”). 
 71. See Puget Sound Plywood, Inc. 44 T.C. at 308 (discussing the second principle of 
cooperative economic theory). See also id. and accompanying text. 
 72. See id. at 309 (“In the case of the corporation-for-profit, . . . equity owners . . . 
select the management and control the functions and policies of their entity— not on a one-
person one-vote basis without use of proxies, but rather through multiple voting in 
proportion to the number of shares of capital stock which they hold.”). 
 73. See id. (noting that profits immediately vest and are retained by the cooperative 
members). 
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proportionate to each member’s use of the cooperative.74 This has the effect 
of paying back a portion of each dollar spent by members on the 
cooperative’s services during a given period. 75  Because any profits are 
instead distributed back to the members as “savings,” this model 
encourages the operation of a cooperative at cost. 76  Together, these 
principles of cooperative organization and operation illustrate that they are 
designed to be owned and controlled by their patrons.77 
In addition to fundamental principles of cooperative structure, the 
Service requires electrical cooperatives to follow a number of ancillary 
rules. 78  First, RECs must at all times maintain records showing each 
member’s interest in the assets of the organization, and cannot accumulate 
funds beyond the “reasonable needs of the organization’s business.”79 Upon 
dissolution, gains from the sale of appreciated assets must also be 
distributed to members during the ownership period of the asset 
proportionate to the amount of business between the member and the 
organization.80 Because members’ rights and interests cannot be forfeited,81 
former members who have since left the electrical cooperative may be 
entitled to a portion of the distribution upon dissolution.82 In practice, these 
rules serve to clarify the duties of RECs rather than burden them with 
additional obligations.83  
 
                                                                                                                           
 74. See Seto & Chasin, supra note 57, at 178 (explaining that the immediate vesting of 
profits prevents a cooperative from operating at a profit or a loss). 
 75. See id. (“A cooperative’s savings belong to its member-patrons, not the 
organization, and it must allocate the savings to its member-patrons in proportion to the 
amount of business it did with each.”). 
 76. See id. (discussing how the vesting of excess net revenues acts as “savings” for 
cooperative members). 
 77. See Puget Sound Plywood, Inc., 44 T.C. at 307–08 (describing how the 
cooperative principles work together). 
 78. See Rev. Rul. 72-36, 1972-1 C.B. 151 (including a question and answer section to 
provide guidance on the ancillary rules). 
 79. See id. (requiring organizations to keep any records necessary to determine the 
rights and interests of members, and prohibiting them from accumulating more funds than 
necessary to operate the organization). 
 80. See id. (“[G]ains should be distributed to all persons who were members during 
the period which the asset was owned by the organization in proportion to the amount of 
business done by such members during that period, insofar as is practicable.”). 
 81. See id. (explaining that organizations that forfeit rights and interests of former 
members are not cooperatives and are therefore not exempt). 
 82. See Rev. Rul. 81-109, 1981-1 C.B. 347 (“Inasmuch as a former shareholder does 
not receive from the organization his pro-rata share of the annual savings accumulated while 
he was a member when his membership is terminated upon the sale of his stock, he should 
receive the distribution upon dissolution.”).  
 83. See Seto & Chasin, supra note 57, at 178 (specifying that the revenue ruling serves 
to explain the Code’s requirements). 
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2. Adherence to Specified Activities 
Cooperatives receiving federal tax exemption must hew closely to 
the activities for which they were created and for which the Code provides 
exemption. For RECs, this means generating or providing electrical service 
to members. Courts have held that the sale, repair, manufacture, or 
financing of electrical appliances, or the installation of electrical systems, 
are not exempt activities under § 501(c)(12).84 If a business is organized as 
a cooperative and engages in exempt activities, it is immaterial that each of 
its members are themselves cooperatives, or that it acts in furtherance of 
rural electrification.85 In addition to the activities specifically permitted by 
the statute, § 501(c)(12) alludes to “like organizations,” a term that the 
Service has interpreted narrowly: 
[I]t is clear that the term “like organizations” as used in the 
statute is limited by the types of organizations specified in 
the statute, and is applicable only to those mutual or 
cooperative organizations which are engaged in activities 
similar in nature to the benevolent insurance or public 
utility type of service or business customarily conducted by 
the specified organizations.86 
The “public utility type” activities standard has allowed RECs to expand 
their service offerings in a number of new directions without tax 
consequences. The Service has specifically determined that a cooperatively 
structured organization providing public utility type services is a “like 
organization” appropriate for tax exemption. 87  As a result, RECs are 
permitted to own natural gas, water, and sewer services in addition to 
providing electricity.88 Other activities, even those that are energy related, 
are not tax-exempt. For example, the sale of tanked propane gas is not 
appropriate for tax exemption because it is not a traditional utility-type 
                                                                                                                           
 84. See Consumers Credit Rural Elec. Co-op. Corp. v. Comm’r, 37 T.C. 136, 143 
(1961), aff’d 319 F.2d 475 (6th Cir. 1963) (determining that financing consumer purchases 
was not a “like organization” under the Code). 
 85. See id. at 143 (explaining that merely organizing a business as a cooperative will 
not automatically bring them into the category of those organizations exempt under § 
501(c)(12)). 
 86. Rev. Rul. 65-201, 1965-2 C.B. 170. 
 87. See Rev. Rul. 67-265, 1967-2 C.B. 205 (finding “like organization” to mean 
“those . . . cooperative organizations which are engaged in activities similar in nature to 
the . . . public utility type of service or business customarily conducted by the specified 
organizations”). 
 88. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-15-045 (Apr. 11, 1997) (concluding that a tax-exempt 
REC would retain its exemption even after expanding its services in this manner). 
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service, regulated by the state or reliant on extensive infrastructure.89 The 
I.R.S. has chosen to tax this activity as unrelated business income rather 
than prohibit it outright as some states have done.90 Although this article 
does not investigate the numerous state statutes governing the operation of 
RECs, many state courts are unforgiving of deviations from the traditional 
electrical service role for which these organizations were created.91 
 
3. The Eighty-Five Percent Requirement 
The most significant requirement to maintain tax exemption for 
most RECs today is the rule that “85 percent or more of [their] income 
consists of amounts collected from members for the sole purpose of 
meeting losses and expenses.”92 Added with the Revenue Act of 1924, this 
language allows for some income to be generated by a cooperative from 
non-member sources.93 The requirement was designed to relax the financial 
rules governing RECs, permitting them to invest their financial reserves in 
interest-bearing accounts while nonetheless preventing them from 
becoming de facto investment houses. 94  For the purposes of the 
requirement, member income refers only to income that is derived from 
members and from “like organization” activities.95 Thus, income unrelated 
to electrical service, such as the sale of propane discussed earlier, cannot be 
counted as member income because is it not a “like organization” activity, 
even if the sale is made to a member.96 Furthermore, income not meeting 
                                                                                                                           
 89. See Rev. Rul. 2002-54, 2002-2 C.B. 527 (determining that propane sale and 
distribution was not a utility-type service for purposes of § 501(c)(12)). 
 90. See id. (concluding that the sale of tanked propane would be subject to unrelated 
business income tax §§ 511–13). 
 91. See, e.g., Lewis v. Jackson Energy Co-op. Corp., 189 S.W.3d 87 (Ky. 2005) 
(concluding that rural electric cooperatives are prohibited from distributing propane on the 
grounds that the state statute defined the permissible activities of cooperatives). 
 92. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(12)(A) (2012). 
 93. Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. 68-176, 43 Stat. 253 (“[M]utual or cooperative 
telephone companies, or like organizations; but only if 85 per centum or more of the income 
consists of amounts collected from members for the sole purpose of meeting losses and 
expenses.”). 
 94. See 65 Cong. Rec. 7, 128–29 (1924) (discussing the purpose of the eighty-five 
percent requirement). 
 95. See Rev. Rul. 2002-54, 2002-2 C.B. 527 (determining that income derived from 
activities that are not “like organization” activities constitutes nonmember income for the 
purposes of the eighty-five percent member income test). 
 96. See id. (finding that sales of tanked propane to members represent nonmember 
income for purposes of calculating the eighty-five percent member income test). 
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these requirements is subject to the unrelated business income tax.97 This 
means that when meeting the eighty-five percent requirement, tax 
exemption applies only to the “like organization” activities and does not 
shield the organization’s other ventures from federal taxation.98 The eighty-
five percent requirement is computed each taxable year, and an REC may 
fail the test one year while passing it in subsequent years.99 
There is a surprising amount of complexity in the eighty-five 
percent requirement. First, the scope of member income and permissible 
“losses and expenses” has yet to be settled by the Service and the courts.100 
In addition, there are a number of categories of income that the federal 
statute specifically excludes from the eighty-five percent requirement, such 
as income from “qualified pole rentals” or “nuclear decommissioning” 
transactions.101 The I.R.S. has further determined that profits from the sale 
of excess fuel at cost during the year of its purchase need not be counted.102 
While these complexities affect peripheral cases, the basic REC model 
meets the eighty-five percent requirement when it bills its members at cost 
and does not deviate from its core business. 
 
IV. Problems with RECs Today 
A. Changing Identity 
Most electrical cooperatives were organized with the specific 
purpose of serving poor rural areas that would not otherwise receive 
electrical service. 103  They generally formed as a response to the 
unwillingness of private power companies to extend service into rural areas, 
                                                                                                                           
 97. See id. (“The unrelated business income tax provisions, §§ 511–513, provide that 
the income of a cooperative exempt under § 501(c)(12) is subject to unrelated business 
income tax if the income is derived from an activity unrelated to its exempt purpose.”). 
 98. See id. (concluding that tax exemption does not apply to non-exempt activities, 
even though the organization’s utility-type activities may be exempt). 
 99. See Rev. Rul. 65-99, 1965-1 C.B. 242 (describing the annual computation of the 
eighty-five percent requirement). 
 100. See Clayton S. Reynolds, Tax-Exempt Electric Cooperatives: A Discussion of 
Issues Relating to the 85% Member Income Requirement, 55 TAX LAW. 585, 600–02 (2002) 
(exploring various ambiguities in the eighty-five percent member income requirement). 
 101. See § 501(c)(12)(C) (excluding income earned from qualified pole rentals, certain 
sales of electric energy distribution and transmission services, any nuclear decommissioning 
transaction, or any asset exchange or conversion transaction).  
 102. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PUBL’N 557: TAX-EXEMPT STATUS FOR YOUR ORG. 
58 (2011) (“An electric cooperative’s sale of excess fuel at cost in the year of purchase is not 
income for purposes of determining compliance with the 85% requirement.”). 
 103. See PATRICK DAHL, THE NEXT GREATEST THING 40–41 (Richard A. Pence ed., 
1986) (describing the incredible lack of services and conveniences in rural areas caused by 
the lack of electricity in the early twentieth century). 
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and with encouragement of the federal government.104 Municipal power 
companies were even less helpful.105 While the lack of electricity was seen 
by progressives as an inequity, it took on dramatic new importance as the 
federal government looked for ways to improve rural economic output 
during the Great Depression.106  Thus, the creation of the REA put the 
government directly in the business of promoting rural electrification, and 
providing loans and administrative guidance was quickly determined to be 
the most efficient way forward.107  
Well before the REA made electrical cooperatives an integral part 
of the nation’s electrical network, the federal government had granted these 
and similar cooperatives tax exemption with the Revenue Act of 1918.108 
The exemption was granted—and is maintained today—on the premise that 
RECs serve a public good without profit motives, and are therefore worthy 
of tax exemption. 109  Cooperatives and other mutual organizations have 
enjoyed a privileged status since the first income tax in America, with one 
senator in 1894 calling the intent to tax such organizations a “crowning 
infamy.” 110  Popular sentiments aligned with the realities of the time: 
cooperatives and mutual companies were recognized as ways to protect 
poor and rural farmers from their precarious economic environment. 111 
Furthermore, mutual and cooperative organizations at the time were so 
small and generated so little income that Congress noted that “[t]he 
securing of returns from them has been a source of annoyance and expense 
and has resulted in the collection of either no tax or an amount which is 
                                                                                                                           
 104. See BROWN, supra note 7, at 11–12 (noting the reasons for the slow rate at which 
rural areas were being wired by investor-owned power companies). 
 105. See id. at 52 (recounting the unwillingness of municipal power companies to 
partner with the REA to extend service to rural areas).  
 106. See id. at 35–39 (discussing the rural electrification work of the Tennessee Valley 
Authority). The Tennessee Valley Authority was an important forerunner to federal 
electrification programs. Specifically designed to improve the lives of the people living in 
and around the Tennessee River in numerous ways, the TVA launched a government-
sponsored REC with great success, showing the social and economic benefit of providing 
electricity to rural areas, but also the financial feasibility of electrical cooperatives. Id. 
 107. See id. at 47–57 (explaining that the continued refusal of investor-owned power 
companies left cooperatives as the only viable partners for the REA). 
 108. See Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, 40 Stat. 1057 (providing tax 
exemption for local mutual organizations and other “like organizations of a purely local 
character”). 
 109. See id. § 231(10) (stating that tax exemption for these organizations resulted from 
their income consisting of fees collected from members for the sole purpose of meeting 
expenses rather than to collect a profit). 
 110. See James J. McGovern, The Exemption Provisions of Subchapter F, 29 TAX L. 
523, 526 (1976) (quoting Senator Hill during the 1894 debate over the mutual savings 
banks’ exemption). 
 111. See id. at 536 (discussing the rationale for exempting mutual and cooperative 
organizations). 
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practically negligible.”112 RECs were viewed as especially noble because of 
the era in which they emerged. In addition to the hope and modernity they 
brought to farming communities, electrical cooperatives were seen as a 
stand by small farmers against greedy capitalists at a time when the Great 
Depression highlighted the disparities of class and wealth in America.113 
The United States today looks very different, and the question of 
continued tax exemption of RECs should now be revisited. First and most 
importantly, the goal of national electrification has been achieved; by 1962, 
97.6% of farms were receiving central service station electricity.114 The 
REA was created to combat the poverty of rural farming communities, 
granting them access to a world of mechanized equipment, electric lighting, 
and indoor plumbing.115 There is no question that rural areas now have 
these amenities. No household or business in America today is denied 
access to electricity because of its geographic location.116  The mission, 
therefore, has been successfully accomplished. This is important because 
the federal government launched the REA and its REC-friendly policies for 
the sole purpose of rural electrification and development. 117  The REA 
persists today however, repackaged as the Rural Utility Service within the 
Department of Agriculture.118 
In completing the government’s mission, the cooperatives 
themselves have changed. The first RECs were truly community affairs, 
with a handful of neighbors organizing a cooperative for the wiring of their 
farms.119 Modern RECs are large, complex, and hierarchical organizations 
often far removed from the community spirit that defined their early years. 
                                                                                                                           
 112. H.R. REP. No. 64-922, at 4 (1916). 
 113. See DAHL, supra note 103, at 39–59 (discussing the era in which early RECs, and 
later the REA, were formed). 
 114. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., RURAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION, REPORT OF THE 
ADMINISTRATOR, 16 (1962). 
 115. See AMITY SHLAES, THE FORGOTTEN MAN: A NEW HISTORY OF THE GREAT 
DEPRESSION 175 (2007) (discussing the government’s goals for rural electrification). The 
Roosevelt administration’s four goals were to (1) provide electricity to homes and farms; 
(2) increase its use in all homes to provide a better standard of living; (3) reduce the cost of 
electricity to the average consumer; and (4) create a “new and more prosperous form of 
society.” Id. 
 116. See DAHL, supra note 103, at 75 (extolling the triumph of the rural electrification 
cause). 
 117. See SHLAES, supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 118. The REA was rolled into the Rural Utility Service as part of the Federal Crop 
Insurance Reform and Department of Agriculture Reorganization Act of 1994. Pub. L. No. 
103-354, 108 Stat. 3209 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6901 et. seq.). 
 119. See DAHL, supra note 103, at 82 (recounting the creation of the early RECs as 
community affairs that went door-to-door to secure support for electricity). 
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The median electrical cooperative has 13,000 members,120 with the largest 
having nearly a quarter million spread over 8,100 square miles.121 RECs 
today hold monopolies over their service areas, are managed by highly paid 
professionals, and have lobbyists in Washington.122 Moreover, they are now 
widely seen as de facto public utilities because of their obligation to offer 
membership to all those living in their defined geographic service area, and 
the necessity of electricity in modern living. 123  This growth and 
formalization has made RECs into big business: today they collectively 
serve 42 million people and have assets totaling $140 billion.124 The $40 
billion in revenue that they collected in 2010, however, remains exempt 
from federal taxation.125 
In addition, RECs are no longer strictly rural. The communities 
they serve have grown from rural towns into small cities as suburban sprawl 
has replaced farmland.126 The Rural Electrification Act defines rural as any 
area “not included within the boundaries of any city, village, or borough 
having a population in excess of fifteen hundred inhabitants.”127 Although 
the populations of their service areas have swelled—driving down the 
distribution costs per customer—RECs have continued to operate as 
usual.128 This is sometimes true even where portions of their service area 
are annexed by a municipality with its own electrical service.129  RECs 
                                                                                                                           
 120. See Co-op Facts and Figures, supra note 2 (listing the median number of members 
today). 
 121. See 2011 Annual Report, PEDERNALES ELECTRICAL COOPERATIVE 6, available at 
http://www.pec.coop/docs/default-source/annual-reports/2011_Annual_Report.pdf?sfvrsn=5 
(showing the Pedernales Electrical Cooperative in Texas to be the largest REC in the 
country, with 203,810 members holding 242,331 active accounts at the close of 2011 and 
covering a service area nearly the size of New Jersey) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND 
LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 122. See Cooper, supra note 34, at 339 (stating that the NRECA serves as the trade 
association and lobbying arm for RECs). 
 123. See ROGER D. COLTON, THE REGULATION OF RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES 
§ 1.1.2 (1993) (noting the different factors that have generally led modern courts to conclude 
that RECs are public utilities, even where exempt from state utility commission jurisdiction). 
 124. See 2011 Annual Meeting Fact Sheet, NATIONAL RURAL ELECTRICAL 
COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION (Mar. 2012), http://www.nreca.coop/members/Co-
opFacts/Documents/AnnualMeetingFactSheet.pdf (totaling the impact of RECs today) (on 
file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 125. See COLTON, supra note 123 (noting the revenue RECs received in 2010). 
 126. See GARWOOD & TUTHILL, supra note 6, at 27 (discussing the rise in urban sprawl 
and its relation to RECs). 
 127. 7 U.S.C. § 924 (2012). 
 128. See Co-op Facts and Figures, supra note 2 (showing the current status of electric 
cooperatives and their relative distribution cost to investor- or publicly-owned corporations). 
 129. See, e.g., City of Morgan City v. S. Louisiana Elec. Co-op. Ass’n, 31 F.3d 319, 
324 (5th Cir. 1994) (determining that a municipality’s attempt to condemn an REC’s service 
area so that the members would become customers of the municipal power company was 
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currently provide electricity to suburbs of cities such as Atlanta, Orlando, 
Washington, D.C., Cincinnati, Fort Worth, Austin, Denver, and 
Nashville. 130  Today wholly 29.2% of the counties served by RECs are 
classified as metropolitan, 9.4% of which have populations of one million 
or more.131 These changes are significant because of the economic realities 
they represent. REC tax exemption is premised on the belief that 
cooperative members are too dispersed for electrical service to be provided 
to them profitably. 132  If population densities are such that other power 
companies can now profitably provide electricity to a cooperative’s service 
area, the REC’s tax exemption no longer advances the public interest, and 
should not continue. In sum, the reality of modern RECs is far different 
than their venerable forebears. The sentiments that insulated the first 
generation of RECs from taxation regulation are not applicable to modern 
RECs. 
 
B. Straying from Their Mission as RECs and Tax-Exempt Nonprofits 
Many electric cooperatives today have drifted from their duties as 
nonprofits and their obligations as cooperatives. First, some RECs are 
failing to provide “at-cost” service to their members by unnecessarily 
retaining member equity rather than refunding it or lowering their rates.133 
While there is no bright line rule governing the return of member equity or 
the lowering of rates, RECs have kept an increasing portion of member 
equity that should have been returned to their members or not collected at 
all.134 In 2006 alone, equity across all RECs grew by $2 billion, though only 
$499 million was refunded.135 Because members are not generally provided 
with statements of their total equity in the organization (though such 
                                                                                                                 
impermissible and frustrated the purpose of the Rural Electrification Act to provide 
affordable power to rural areas). 
 130. See Cooper, supra note 34, at 350 (listing a number of cities the suburbs of which 
have expanded into regions served by RECs). 
 131. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-647, RURAL UTILITIES 
SERVICE: OPPORTUNITIES TO BETTER TARGET ASSISTANCE TO RURAL AREAS AND AVOID 
UNNECESSARY FINANCIAL RISK 4 (2004) (noting the proportion of populations served in non-
rural areas). 
 132. The cooperative model was promoted by the REA only after investor-owned and 
municipal power companies found serving rural areas prohibitively expensive. See BROWN, 
supra note 7, at 48–54 (recounting how that agency had originally planned to work with 
private power companies). 
 133. See Cooper, supra note 34, at 355–56 (explaining the practice of retaining member 
equity and producing non-itemized bills for cooperative members).  
 134. See id. at 351 (discussing the volume of member equity that RECs now keep). 
 135. See id. at 352 (noting that these large refunds represent only a fraction of the sum 
that could be refunded). 
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records must be kept) or the refund rates of other cooperatives, they are left 
uninformed, grateful for any funds returned to them.136 The funds retained 
by RECs are used in lieu of loans because they are viewed as even less 
expensive and more readily available than subsidized loans from the Rural 
Utilities Service.137 Member equity is also used to fund efforts to prevent 
mergers and takeovers, despite the fact that such takeovers could result in 
greater efficiency and lower rates for members.138 Even when not used in 
these ways, equity is not actively benefitting members: A number of 
metrics suggest that RECs are overcapitalized by roughly ten to thirty 
percent.139 Despite their obligation to remit capital, the lax oversight and 
minimal reporting requirements make returning member equity difficult to 
monitor and enforce.140 Easy access to member equity funds weakens the 
incentive for more efficient operation, and does not comport with 
cooperatives’ member-focused principles.141 
In addition to withholding member equity, some RECs have 
expanded their operations away from electrical generation and 
transmission.142  Most of these new ventures are in other utility sectors 
(sewer, water, telephone, etc.), but some are simply for-profit subsidiary 
ventures.143 As mentioned above, the I.R.S. now allows cooperatives to 
distribute propane, even though this activity is unrelated to electricity and is 
not a utility-type activity.144 Some RECs have gone even further, using 
subsidiaries to diversify into golf courses, newspapers, shopping centers, 
                                                                                                                           
 136. See id. (discussing the rate at which RECs refund member equity and the 
disclosures surrounding this rate). 
 137. See id. at 367 (explaining that REC administrators view member equity as a free or 
extremely cheap source of capital). 
 138. See id. at 340 (noting that most RECs contribute to a fund that serves to prevent 
takeover attempts and territorial disputes). 
 139. See id. at 365 (concluding that RECs are overcapitalized based on their TIER and 
equity as a percent of assets). 
 140. See id. at 345 (“Co-ops continue to be largely free from regulation due to political 
reluctance to interfere with what appear from the outside to be smoothly-running 
operations. . . . Customer ownership is another reason for lack of scrutiny. In theory, electric 
co-ops are continually self-regulating . . . .”). 
 141. See id. at 351 (stating that NRECA has warned its members to return member 
equity in order to preserve their tax and legal statuses). 
 142. See id. at 341 (discussing a Texas cooperative that borrowed money to buy a golf 
course). 
 143. See Maintain Cooperatives’ Exemption from FCC Pole Attachment Oversight, 
NAT’L RURAL ELEC. COOP. ASS’N (Apr. 29, 2013), http://www.nreca.coop/wp-
content/uploads/2013/07/FastFactsPoleAttachment.pdf (arguing that cooperatives charge the 
lowest rates for cable and telecommunication services) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND 
LEE JOURNAL of ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 144. See supra notes 69–70 and accompanying text. 
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and hotels.145  While income from these activities would presumably be 
classified as taxable “nonmember” income for purposes of the eighty-five 
percent requirement, such an expansion into for-profit ventures shows the 
need for regulatory oversight and runs counter to the spirit which granted 
RECs their tax-exempt status.146 
 
V. Remedies 
A. New Scrutiny of Nonprofits 
Taken as a whole, nonprofit electrical cooperatives today act much 
like their for-profit counterparts. 147  Despite their humble roots, today’s 
RECs are large and professionally managed organizations that are a far cry 
from their populist past.148 Moreover, many seem to have lost focus on their 
member-centric mission, failing to adhere to their traditional nonprofit 
purposes.149 
This situation is not unique to RECs.150 Nonprofit hospitals have 
seen their purpose and place in the community change in a manner that 
mirrors what has happened to electrical cooperatives.151 Originally founded 
as almshouses to provide medical care to the poor, hospitals have 
transformed into large, professional, and economically viable businesses 
with wealth and power far exceeding their charitable forebears.152  This 
transformation has resulted in charges that nonprofit hospitals do not 
                                                                                                                           
 145. See Steven Mufson, Defaults Plague Little-Known Lender, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 
2007, at D1 (discussing the financial problems related to some RECs’ non-utility 
investments). 
 146. See Reynolds, supra note 100, at 596 (discussing the I.R.S. conclusion that all 
subsidiary income is classified as non-member income). 
 147. See Roger D. Colton & Doug Smith, Co-Op Membership and Utility Shutoffs: 
Service Protections that Arise as an Incident of REC Membership, 29 IDAHO L. REV. 2, 2–3 
(discussing the populist movement from which RECs developed and the similarities between 
RECs and investor-owned utilities)  
 148. See id. at 5 (“RECs are no longer small groups of individuals who have voluntarily 
banded together to serve themselves.”).  
 149. See id. (“RECs are most often large, complex, hierarchical organizations that are 
often far removed—physically as well as in spirit—from the needs of their less fortunate 
members.”). 
 150. See, e.g., James B. Simpson & Sarah D. Strum, How Good a Samaritan? Federal 
Income Tax Exemption for Charitable Hospitals Reconsidered, 14 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 
633, 663 (“Charitable hospitals have become wealthy institutions, with power and presence 
in the community far beyond their almshouse forebears.”).  
 151. See id. (discussing the practice of charitable hospitals denying care to those for 
whom they were meant to provide care). 
 152. See id. at 634ԟ44 (discussing changes in the hospital industry). 
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provide charitable care sufficient to justify their tax exemption.153 Because 
the public they serve is not meaningfully different from their for-profit 
counterparts, these hospitals have been subjected to increasing scholarly 
criticism for the tax breaks that they receive.154 
The line between nonprofit and for-profit activities has blurred in 
other sectors as well.155 Nonprofits have increasingly entered sectors once 
reserved for private industry or government, prompting complaints of 
unequal tax burdens for otherwise equal organizations. 156  In 1984, the 
Small Business Administration released a report that questioned the 
continued value of tax-exemption for nonprofits that did not provide a clear 
public benefit. 157  Although this report and subsequent Congressional 
hearings158 did not ultimately change the Service’s treatment of nonprofits, 
the subject continues to be discussed by Congress and the general public.159 
 
B. Increased Oversight 
Many of the more troubling REC activities persist in part because 
of lax oversight. 160  The malfeasance of electrical cooperatives received 
                                                                                                                           
 153. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 109TH CONG., NONPROFIT HOSPITALS AND THE 
PROVISION OF COMMUNITY BENEFITS 2 (2006), available at http:// 
www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/76xx/doc7695/12-06-Nonprofit.pdf (finding that 4.7% of operating 
expenses go to uncompensated care, which is not significantly greater than the 4.2% spent 
by for-profit hospitals). 
 154. See, e.g., M. Gregg Bloche, Health Policy Below the Waterline: Medical Care and 
the Charitable Exemption, 80 MINN. L. REV. 299, 404 (1995) (“[T]he current federal tax 
exemption of nonprofit hospitals is neither explicable nor justifiable in terms of the logic or 
efficiency or reward for virtue.”). 
 155. See Heather Gottry, Profit or Perish: Non-Profit Social Service Organizations & 
Social Entrepreneurship, 6 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 249, 250 (1999) (suggesting that 
the operations of nonprofits are very similar to those of for-profit businesses because 
nonprofits also generate large profits, pay high salaries, make investments, and engage in 
lobbying efforts).  
 156. See id. at 256 (“As non-profits began to enter the for-profit arena, the Small 
Business Administration and a collection of other trade groups began pressuring the 
Government to . . . decrease the overall tax exemptions granted to non-profits.”). 
 157. See OFFICE OF ADVOC., U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., UNFAIR COMPETITION BY 
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS WITH SMALL BUSINESS: AN ISSUE FOR THE 1980S (1983) (“[T]he 
fact that nonprofits are increasingly competing with for-profit firms in a wide range of 
activities is evidence that many nonprofits are not providing ‘public goods’ which private 
competitive firms will not otherwise provide.”). 
 158. See, e.g., Unrelated Business Income Tax: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Oversight of the House Ways and Means Comm., 100th Cong. 217ԟ20 (1987) (statement of 
Joseph O’Neil, Chairman, Business Coalition for Fair Competition). 
 159. See Gottry, supra note 155, at 273 (noting the continued interest in the subject 
despite the lack of Congressional action). 
 160. See Colton & Smith, supra note 147, at 4 (highlighting that RECs are not within 
the jurisdiction of state public utility commissions). 
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Congressional attention in 2008 after directors of the nation’s largest REC 
gave themselves excessive salaries, bonuses, and other compensation whilst 
using $700,000 of member equity to fund lavish personal travel and 
entertainment.161 These abuses stemmed from the lack of transparency in 
the REC’s operation and the closed election process.162 While cooperative 
leaders sought to paint the incident as an isolated case of board corruption, 
the investigation highlighted how little information members have about the 
operations of their cooperatives.163 
Electric cooperatives are subject to minimal regulatory oversight.164 
As de facto public utilities, RECs are subject to consumer protection 
statutes and common law duties to the people in their service areas.165 
Additionally, the principles and structure that undergirds cooperatives are 
designed to prevent the sort of abuses that can manifest with private 
utilities.166 While these elements are theoretically sufficient, in reality they 
are inadequate to prevent inefficiencies and the mistreatment of 
members. 167  Despite the prevalence of state statutes addressing the 
formation and operation of cooperatives, state utility commissions do not 
generally govern RECs.168 In fact, only thirteen states regulate the rates 
charged to members, a mere seven of which regulate RECs comparably to 
private power companies.169 The Federal Energy Regulation Commission 
has authority over wholesale sales and bulk transmission of electric power, 
but is explicitly excluded from regulating cooperatives. 170  The Rural 
                                                                                                                           
 161. See generally Governance and Financial Accountability of Rural Electric 
Cooperatives: The Pedernales Experience: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and 
Gov. Reform, 110th Cong. (2008), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
110hhrg46194/html/CHRG-110hhrg46194.htm [hereinafter Pedernales Hearing] 
(discussing the misdeeds of the Pedernales board). 
 162. See id. (noting, through the statements of several witnesses, that lack of oversight 
and the closed election of directors were at the root of the abuses). 
 163. See id. (underscoring the lack of information that the members had as the events 
unfolded). 
 164. See Colton & Smith, supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
 165. See COLTON, supra note 123, § 4 (discussing the common law duties that RECs 
owe to their members and to the people in their service areas). 
 166. See Melissa A. Jamison, Rural Electric Cooperatives: A Model for Indigenous 
Peoples’ Permanent Sovereignty Over Their Natural Resources, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L 
L. 401, 440 n.255 (2005) (“The [investor-owned utilities] would only provide such services 
if farmers would pay costs of construction, which at the time, could be as high as $2,000 per 
mile.”). 
 167. See Colton & Smith, supra note 147, at 5 (arguing for consumer protections from 
RECs similar to those that consumers have from investor-owned utilities). 
 168. See Gottry, supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
 169. See Cooper, supra note 34, at 342 n.50 (discussing the state regulation of RECs). 
 170. See Public Utility Act of 1935, Pub. L. 74-333, 49 Stat. 847 (codified as amended 
at 16 U.S.C. §§ 791A et seq.) (designating the Federal Power Commission as an independent 
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Utilities Service has authority over RECs, but can only enforce affirmative 
covenants, spending limitations, and financial disclosure requirements 
connected to its loans.171 Moreover, almost half of the money loaned to 
electrical cooperatives today comes from the National Rural Utilities 
Cooperative Finance Corporation, a nonprofit bank created by the RECs.172 
Loans originating from this lender have no public reporting requirements.173 
In fact, the only organization that has authority over all electrical 
cooperatives is the I.R.S., which can withhold tax-exempt status from 
organizations that do not meet its exemption prerequisites.174 Furthermore, 
I.R.S. Form 990, which must be completed by all tax-exempt organizations 
annually, is the only publicly available document common to all electrical 
cooperatives. 175  In sum, RECs are largely unmoored from regulatory 
oversight, and face only negligible public reporting requirements.176 
There is no doubt that a state-sanctioned regional monopoly of an 
essential service raises the potential for abuse and inefficiency.177 Municipal 
and investor-owned utilities are subject to rate and other regulations by 
federal and state utility commissions because of the inherent vulnerability 
of their customers.178 RECs have escaped this regulation by claiming that 
they are not utilities but are instead nonprofits created to serve the public 
                                                                                                                 
agency, and giving neither the Federal Power Commission nor its successor agency, the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, authority to regulate RECs). 
 171. See Cooper, supra note 34, at 344 (describing the limited authority that the Rural 
Utility Service has over cooperatives). 
 172. See Keck, supra note 8, at 57 (discussing the National Rural Utilities Cooperative 
Finance Corporation, which was formed by RECs at the urging of Congress as way to reduce 
reliance on REA loans). 
 173. See Cooper, supra note 34, at 344 (stating that these loans do not require public 
disclosures). 
 174. See Seto & Chasin, supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 175. See Cooper, supra note 34, at 359–60 (“The only new window on co-op 
performance is the availability of IRS Form 990, a disclosure required from any tax-exempt 
entity.”). 
 176. See id. at 343 (“[C]oops are lightly regulated at both the federal and state level.”). 
 177. See Note, Condemnation of Public Utilities: A New York Statute and a New 
Approach, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 916, 916 (1954) (“But since monopolistic power opens the 
door to abuse, these . . . utilities are ordinarily subjected to government regulation.”). 
 178. Public utilities commissions are found in all fifty states and are represented 
collectively by the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissions. These 
commissions generally cite consumer protection as one of their missions. For example, the 
California Public Utilities Commission states on its website that it “serves the public interest 
by protecting consumers and ensuring the provision of safe, reliable utility service and 
infrastructure at reasonable rates, with a commitment to environmental enhancement and a 
healthy California economy.” CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/puc/ (last 
visited Oct. 3, 2013) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL of ENERGY, CLIMATE, 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
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good.179 The courts no longer accept this line of argument, and one court 
notes that designation as a utility “does not depend on legislative definition, 
but on the nature of the business or service rendered.”180 Yet RECs are 
nonetheless specifically exempt from most state utility commissions. 181 
This freedom from scrutiny is premised on the idea that, in addition to their 
noble and populist past, the cooperative model was inherently self-
regulating and without profit motive. 182  Electrical cooperatives, the 
argument went, did not need regulation.183 While this may have been true at 
the time of their provincial origins, their present size and complexity 
undermines this rationale, as evidenced both by the scandals that have 
emerged and the persistent failure of cooperatives to refund member 
equity.184 Because today’s RECs can subject their members to abuses and 
overcharges no different than investor-owned or municipal power 
companies, they should now face similar regulatory scrutiny. 185 
Cooperatives may argue that the rural nature of their members drives up 
their per-capita distribution costs, making their rates incomparable to the 
more densely populated areas served by private and municipal power 
companies.186 However, these differences are minimal and shrinking, and 
are easily outweighed by the need for transparency and oversight. 187 
Subjecting RECs to the same cost-of-service regulations as their municipal 
and investor-owned peers would ultimately benefit their members.188 
Increased transparency could eliminate some of the more 
problematic electric cooperative activities.189 For example, the I.R.S. could 
require RECs to annually disclose data relating to their member equity 
accounts.190 Cooperatives forced to disclose the amount of member equity 
                                                                                                                           
 179. See COLTON, supra note 123, § 1.1.2 (discussing the determinative characteristics 
of whether RECs should be treated as a public utility). 
 180. Aberdeen Cable TV Serv. v. City of Aberdeen, 176 N.W.2d 738, 741 (S.D. 1970) 
(quoting 73B C.J.S. Public Utilities § 2 (2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 181. See Cooper, supra note 34, at 342 n.53 (noting that only thirteen states regulate 
RECs). 
 182. See id. at 345 (noting that RECs appear to some to be “smooth running 
operations”). 
 183. See id. (“In theory, electric co-ops are continually self-regulating . . . .”). 
 184. See supra Part IV, supra. 
 185. See Colton & Smith, supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
 186. See Keck, supra note 8, at 70–71 (discussing the differing costs of serving rural 
versus urban customers). 
 187. See id. (concluding that these differences are negligible). 
 188. See Cooper, supra note 34, at 368 (arguing “at cost” service will see reduced rates, 
volume, or patronage capital, which are benefits for members). 
 189. See id. at 370 (highlighting governance as a way to achieve “at cost” service and 
prevent cooperatives from retaining surplus member equity). 
 190. See id. at 373 (“Empowerment begins with requiring all co-ops to disclose each 
member’s equity stake at least annually.”). 
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they retain would feel pressured to return more of it because members 
would have more insight into the finances of their cooperative.191 In the 
absence of other regulations, such disclosure could be achieved through 
amendments to I.R.S. Form 990. 192  This form was revised in 2008 to 
encourage good governance of tax-exempt organizations through increased 
transparency. 193  The revisions have dramatically increased the required 
disclosures of financial information and governance practices. 194  Most 
notably, the form seeks to address concerns surrounding nonprofit hospital 
activities by requiring them to complete a series of industry-specific 
questions in Schedule H, on the theory that requiring the disclosures will 
yield better practices.195 RECs could be tasked with a similar reporting 
requirement.196 Requiring disclosures specific to RECs could force these 
cooperatives to publicly release financial and governance information 
important to their members.197 Although they do not share the community 
benefit requirement of hospitals or other charities, RECs could provide 
information about financial health, voting policies, and equity accounts that 
would likely be of interest to their members.198 Members would then be 
able to make informed decisions when voting in REC board elections, and 
could replace directors with whom they became sufficiently dissatisfied.199 
 
 
                                                                                                                           
 191. See id. at 339 (“[C]o-ops have tried to hide information from their members—
information to which owners are entitled in other business contexts.”). 
 192. See Sheilah O’Halloran & Van Zimmerman, The New Form 990, 263-APR N.J. L. 
9, 9 (2010) (discussing the I.R.S.’s use of Form 990 to increase review of compliance of tax 
exempt organizations). 
 193. See id. at 10 (describing recent changes to the Form 990). 
 194. See id. (detailing the different types of information that the revised Form 990 
requires to be disclosed). 
 195. See Eileen Salinsky, Nat’l Health Policy Forum, The George Washington Univ., 
Background Paper No. 67, Schedule H: New Community Benefit Reporting Requirements 
for Hospitals 4 (2009), available at http:// www.nhpf.org/library/background-
papers/BP67_ScheduleH_04-21-09.pdf (discussing the details and intentions of schedule H) 
(on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL of ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
 196. See Cooper, supra note 34, at 359 (arguing comparisons with other cooperatives 
would allow for greater industry-wide understanding of cooperative procedures). 
 197. See 2013 Instructions for Form 990 Return of Organization Exempt From Income 
Tax, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i990.pdf 
(“Some members of the public rely on Form 990 or 990-EZ as their primary or sole source 
of information about a particular organization.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE 
JOURNAL of ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 198. See Cooper, supra note 34, at 373 (discussing methods of empowering cooperative 
members, such as disclosure of members’ equity and allowance of proxy voting). 
 199. See Puget Sound Plywood, Inc., 44 T.C. at 308 (noting the democratic nature of 
cooperatives). 
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C. Removing Tax-Exempt Status 
Increasing the disclosure requirements in Form 990 will fully 
address the complexity and varied operations of RECs today. While 
additions to this disclosure statement might provide valuable information, 
they would not go far enough to protect members from abuse and 
inefficiency, nor would they empower individual members who live within 
state-ordained regional electrical monopolies. RECs may have been 
originally exempt from federal income taxation because of their humble and 
honorable purpose, but they were also exempt on the theory that there 
would be no income to tax; every dollar that the cooperative did not spend 
on its operations was to be returned to the members. 200  Thus, such 
cooperatives were nonprofits by design. 201  Modern RECs that retain 
member equity above their operating costs undermine this rationale. 202 
Their use of member funds for non-operational expenditures shields them 
from market forces that might encourage more efficient business 
practices.203 Because members lack information about the funds owed to 
them and the value they receive as members, RECs have little incentive to 
seek more honest and efficient operations.204 
A better approach may be to remove the § 501(c)(12)(C) exemption 
entirely.205  While this might at first appear unduly harsh to RECs, the 
reality is that this change would free them to pursue ventures available to 
other power companies while simultaneously encouraging more efficient 
operations.206 This is not to say that RECs would be abolished and replaced 
with investor-owned corporations.207 Removing their tax exemption would 
not alter their status as cooperatives or their duty to conform to cooperative 
principles: RECs would still be obligated to serve members rather than 
                                                                                                                           
 200. See Seto & Chasin, supra note 57, at 178 (discussing the centrality of the 
subordination of capital to the cooperative structure). 
 201. See Cooper, supra note 34, at 345–46 (discussing fundamental characteristics of 
electric cooperatives at their creation, including their status as non-profit companies). 
 202. See id. at 350–51 (noting that NRECA found that the failure of cooperatives to 
return equity to their customers was a fundamental problem). 
 203. See id. at 363–67 (“Some co-ops operate almost entirely on equity, if only due to 
their board’s distaste for debt. Equity is perceived as either costless or extremely cheap.”). 
 204. See id. at 352 (stating that members are grateful for any refund and do not compare 
their investment with their refund). 
 205. See id. at 375 (acknowledging the possibility of removing tax exempt status from 
wealth cooperatives). 
 206. See id. at 374 (“Selective removal [of federal subsidies] could also be an effective 
enforcement tool against co-ops that refuse to become more efficient or member-friendly.”). 
 207. See Clayton S. Reynolds, What Then to Do with A Non-Cooperative Cooperative?, 
56 TAX LAW. 825, 825 (2003) [hereinafter Non-Cooperative Cooperative] (explaining that 
the primary purpose of cooperatives still is to provide the best price to their members). 
TAXATION OF RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES 247 
 
 
investors, provide equal voting for members, and remit member equity.208 
Rather, they would be taxed as non-exempt cooperatives.209 
Subchapter T of the Code governs the taxation of non-exempt 
cooperatives.210 Even before this Subchapter was enacted as part of the 
Revenue Act of 1962,211 it was the Service’s longstanding position that 
member equity distributed to members could be deducted from a 
cooperative’s taxable income, provided that it was operating according to 
cooperative principles.212 Under this arrangement, cooperatives are subject 
to taxation like any corporation, but with the ability to deduct the equity 
returned to members.213 To take advantage of this subchapter, they still 
must operate according to cooperative principles. 214  Subchapter T 
additionally requires that cooperatives separate their member and non-
member income when calculating their gross income so that they cannot 
use an operating loss of their membership activities to offset gains from 
non-member activities.215 While the I.R.S. has advocated that fifty percent 
of the cooperative’s value should be derived from members,216 it conceded 
that failing to meet this benchmark would not deny a cooperative access to 
the benefits of Subchapter T.217 
                                                                                                                           
 208. See id. at 828 (discussing the requirement that non-exempt cooperatives still 
follow cooperative principles). 
 209. See I.R.C. §§ 1381–88 (2012) (eliminating applicability of Subchapter T). 
 210. See I.R.C. § 1381(a)(2)(C) (excluding cooperatives “engaged in furnishing electric 
energy” to rural areas from this subchapter). 
 211. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, 76 Stat. 960 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 212. See Rev. Rul. 54-10, 1954-1 C.B. 24 (1954) (“A cooperative association may 
exclude from its gross income true patronage dividends when made pursuant to a prior 
agreement between the cooperative organization and its patrons.”); see also Rev. Rul. 57-59, 
1957-1 C.B. 24 (1957) (concluding that income derived from non-members cannot be 
excluded from gross income). 
 213. See Joel E. Miller, Which of a Nonexempt Co-Op’s Earnings Are Tax-Exemptible 
Under Subchapter T, 24 J. REAL EST. TAX’N 355, 361–62 (1997) (discussing the tax 
deductions available to cooperatives under Subchapter T). 
 214. See Non-Cooperative Cooperative, supra note 207, at 828 (noting the I.R.S. 
requirement that organizations adhere to fundamental cooperative principles in order to take 
advantage of Subchapter T). 
 215. See Farm Serv. Co-op. v. Comm’r, 619 F.2d 718, 727 (8th Cir. 1980) (stating that 
member and non-member income must be segregated for the purposes of calculating gross 
income). 
 216. See Rev. Rul. 72-602, 1972-2 C.B. 510 modified by Rev. Rul. 93-21, 1993-1 C.B. 
188 (explaining the I.R.S.’s position that fifty percent of the company’s business needed to 
come from members to maintain cooperative status under Subchapter T). 
 217. See Rev. Rul. 93-21, 1993-1 C.B. 188 (abandoning its previous stance). 
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RECs would presumably object to losing their tax-exempt status.218 
Although their tax burden would be small compared to their size, the 
amount of taxation could still be substantial.219 Their trade organization, 
NRECA, would object to this change because it undermines the REC image 
as organizations committed to community improvement.220  Nonetheless, 
removing RECs’ § 501(c)(12) exemption and subjecting them to taxation as 
non-exempt cooperatives would have two significant benefits.221 First, it 
would allow a cooperative to pursue income from non-member patrons 
without restrictions on the business activity or a member-business 
requirement.222 Such activities would be taxed separately from unallocated 
member income, in order to prevent the offsets previously mentioned.223 
This would allow RECs that want to diversify into new areas the room to do 
so without the limitations of the eighty five percent requirement. 224 
However, because RECs do not have investors, there would be little 
incentive to engage in projects that do not benefit members.225 Permitting 
electrical cooperatives to diversify would allow them to meet the needs of 
their members more successfully.226 
                                                                                                                           
 218. See Maintain Cooperatives’ Exemption from FCC Pole Attachment Oversight, 
NAT’L RURAL ELEC. COOP. ASS’N (Apr. 29, 2013), http://www.nreca.coop/wp-
content/uploads/2013/07/FastFactsPoleAttachment.pdf (objecting to the loss of federal pole 
attachment status, which is argued to a part of cooperatives charging cost based rates) (on 
file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL of ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
 219. See Farm Serv. Co-op., 619 F.2d at 727 (“A nonexempt cooperative simply may 
not use patronage losses to reduce its tax liability on nonpatronage-sourced income.”). 
 220. See, e.g., Local Initiatives, NATIONAL RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE 
ASSOCIATION, http://www.ect.coop/category/newsmakers/local-initiatives (last visited Dec. 
16, 2013) (highlighting the democratic and community-focused elements of its member 
cooperatives) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL of ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 221. See Miller, supra note 213, at 358 (“Very early on, it became evident that they 
could function more efficiently if they commanded large sums of money beyond what could 
be raised from outside lenders.”). 
 222. See id. at 359 (discussing the how the Service categorizes different forms of 
cooperative income). 
 223. See id. (discussing the different tax treatment of member and non-member 
income). 
 224. See Rev. Rul. 2002-54, 2002-2 C.B. 527, supra note 95 and accompanying text.  
 225. See Mufson, supra note 145, at D1 (quoting a Fitch rating analyst’s claim that a 
cooperative’s primary goal is to provide competitive rates for its members).  
 226. For example, Dominion, an investor-owned utility spanning four states, offers 
customers a variety of home protection services that augment the electrical, gas, and water 
services it provides. See Home Protection, DOMINION ENERGY SOLUTIONS, 
https://dominionenergy.com/en/home-protection (last visited Oct. 3, 2013) (presenting a 
range of services that Dominion offers in addition to providing electricity) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL of ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
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In addition to allowing them to expand the menu of services they 
offer, ending the tax exemption of electrical cooperatives would greatly 
incentivize the distribution of member equity.227 RECs would be able to 
exclude from taxation not only income from members, but also the income 
from any activity directly related to the cooperative’s principle function.228 
Because holding onto member equity increases the tax burden, cooperatives 
would be more willing to stand by their cooperative principles and return 
equity to the members.229 A prototypical REC would be subject to only the 
smallest amount of taxation because almost all of its income over operating 
costs would be vested in member accounts and distributed to members on a 
regular basis.230 Because this remittance could have tax consequences for 
some members, the cooperative would be pressed to charge members as 
near cost as possible.231 The nuances of Subchapter T and the permutations 
of its application are beyond the scope of this note. It is nonetheless clear 




Some RECs retain many characteristics from their New Deal-era 
creation as democratically managed organizations serving poor rural 
communities that might otherwise struggle to afford electric service.233 
Many others are now large and professionally managed organizations 
whose members view them as little different from for-profit utilities.234 
Such organizations lack transparency or accountability, allowing inefficient 
and detrimental practices to fester.235 Without regulations, disclosures, or 
taxation, there is no outside force to encourage RECs to pursue honest and 
efficient operations.236 The tax and regulatory exemptions that RECs have 
maintained through the years serve no contemporary purpose and fail to 
                                                                                                                           
 227. See Reynolds, supra note 207, at 837 (highlighting the I.R.S.’s arguments 
regarding consequences of failure to operate at cost). 
 228. See Miller, supra note 213, at 365–67 (discussing the types of income that are 
considered “directly related” to a cooperative’s principle business). 
 229. See Reynolds, supra note 227 and accompanying text. 
 230. See Cooper, supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
 231. See Miller, supra note 213, at 362 (discussing the tax consequences that 
cooperative distributions would have for different members). 
 232. See Reynolds, supra note 227 and accompanying text. 
 233. See Cooper, supra note 34, at 336 (“Most co-ops operate in a few rural counties 
where customers live far apart . . . .”). 
 234. See Bloche, supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
 235. See Colton & Smith, supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
 236. See Colton & Smith, supra note 164 and accompanying text.  
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benefit cooperative members.237 On the contrary, they shield cooperatives 
from their obligations to remit equity to their members and seek more 
efficient business practices.238 Lifting the tax exemption of § 501(c)(12) 
would subject RECs to taxation under Subchapter T of the Internal Revenue 
Code, which would encourage efficient practices, allow expansion into new 
ventures, and expose it to a greater degree of market forces. 239  The 
government sought to help rural citizens gain access to electricity by 
protecting electric cooperatives from taxation and regulation. 240  These 
protections now work to insulate cooperatives that to do not act in their 
members’ best interest.241 Maybe it is time for them to end. 
                                                                                                                           
 237. See Cooper, supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
 238. See Cooper, supra note 205 and accompanying text. 
 239. See Cooper, supra note 206 and accompanying text. 
 240. See BROWN, supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 241. See Cooper, supra note 206 and accompanying text. 
